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INTRODUCTION
Many analysts have accepted that South Africa’s “political miracle” was purchased at 
the price o f ensuring the survival of one of the world’s most unequal capitalist systems 
Liberals - with enthusiasm - have argued that South Africa has accepted the inevitability of 
the market and that it has pragmatically adapted to the new international economic order: it 
has removed exchange controls, embraced an export-oriented development strategy, practiced 
strict fiscal discipline, and committed itself to privatization ‘ A number of Marxist analysts 
fundamentally agree with this position, arguing that in a hegemonic global economy there is 
no alternative to the prescriptions of neoliberal economic and social policies outside of an 
unspecified intensification of conflict .^  The Australian political commentator John Pilger 
captures the sense o f disillusionment on the left when he recently lamented that a “historic 
compromise” between the ANC and the apartheid government left economic power in the 
hands o f the corporate white elite, all that has changed is “the inclusion o f a small group of 
blacks into this masonry” ^
Both sets o f arguments curiously fit comfonably within a conventional political 
science elite analysis o f transitions. In much o f this literature it is argued that a transition 
from authoritarianism to democracy must involve an economic pact between elites on both 
sides that leaves the fundamental structures of capitalist society in place, thereby ensuring the 
loyalty o f the propertied classes.^ A conservative pact is seen as all the more essential in 
cases o f “double transition”: states that are simultaneously consolidating democracy and 
reconstructing their economies. Under conditions of globalization it is argued that capital has 
an exit option and growth depends on adopting neoliberal policies that will attract investment 
Yet such a pact will likely increase class inequality and generate popular pressures against 
neoliberalism On this basis some have suggested that democracy should be limited and 
challenges to economic policy-making from civil society curtailed ’ However, we are 
skeptical that such an approach will provide a long-term basis for either democracy or 
growth. At the same time, we doubt that intensified conflict in and of itself will in the long- 
run be favorable for democratic forces Either path will likely lead to an increasing 
estrangement between the economy and society
Claims about the inevitability o f a conservative pact exaggerate the power of 
globalization, by presenting it as an omnipotent force depriving states o f maneuvering room 
in their choice o f development policy. Above all, these positions ignore the power of 
movements and organizations, the importance of institutions, and the strategic choices that 
collective actors can make.'’ Movements resisting economic liberalization may be able to 
create new institutions through which they can process their demands. In turn these 
institutions may be able to create new rules of the game allowing what we describe as 
“bargained liberalization” to occur, in which prominent groups renegotiate the terms on 
which a country engages with the global economy.
In recognizing the existence o f a double transition we accept that these two processes 
are potentially contradictory and may simultaneously undermine both democracy and 
economic growth However we argue that the double transition is potentially reconcilable, 
though on terms neither the advocates of a conservative pact nor their left critics would 
recognize. 'We argue that a class compromise oriented towards growth and redistribution can 
better provide the economic foundations for sustainable democracy. Such a compromise is 
not only desirable, but may be possible even in societies with limited economic resources.
Here we examine the institutions that have been constaicted by workers, employers, 
and the state during the transition to democracy in South Africa, the choices they have made
in developing economic policy, and the possibilities that may be open for a class compromise 
These institutions have had an important effect on the pace and content of economic 
reconstRiction which has not been fully appreciated The changes are far more substantial 
than “the inclusion of a small group of blacks into [the apartheid] masonry,” nor are they 
simply a headlong rush towards neoliberalism
We identify the necessary conditions for a class compromise and argue that the 
institutional means through which one could be struck exist in South Africa However a 
compromise requires a mutually shared sense of stalemate It also requires parties to accept 
that the costs o f not compromising outweigh the benefits to be had by standing firm. Labor, 
capital, the state, and representatives of the “community” have recently made important 
agreements conducive to a class compromise, but it is too soon to tell whether these have 
been made in good faith or whether they can be sustained. As in South African politics in the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s, continued stalemate and the threat o f chaos may make a class 
compromise more desirable than other outcomes, but cannot ensure that it occurs.
It does little good to develop a checklist o f features South Africa shares with other 
democratizing countries, any more than it helps to identify those characteristics unique to its 
peculiar political legacy. South Africa is both exceptional and typical, depending on how and 
what one chooses to compare, as is every other country Rather, a discussion of class 
compromise in South Africa suggests the importance of substantially deepening research on 
the creative activities of popular movements and organizations in other countries attempting 
to con.solidate democracy under conditions of economic reconstruction. Their specific 
national configurations of organizations and institutions may produce opportunities - perhaps 
limited - for bargained liberalization, and possibilities for establishing a new balance between 
the market and society^
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I. RENEGOTIATING CLASS COMPROMISE
A. The Double Transition and Globalization
Globalization presents difficult problems for countries undergoing the double 
transition by generating a number of new stresses on an economy while undermining the 
state’s traditional role in economic management It is widely accepted that globalization has 
contributed to a radical recomposition of the labor market Whereas the long post-war 
expansion had been founded upon permanent Hill-time employment, over the last twenty 
years this base has been transformed: the permanent full-time worker, according to Giddens, 
“has been assaulted
by a host o f other competing modes of work organization - an expansion o f part-time 
work, voluntary career breaks, self-employment and home-working In all these areas 
the ethos of “industry” comes under strain “
Indeed, Standing argues that the insecurity created by the emphasis on flexibility has sharply 
fragmented the labor force, creating a growing stratum of “flexi-workers” - part-time, casual, 
and temporary workers - who, along with the unemployed and the “detached” are emerging as 
the labor force o f the future ’
Globalization has a differential impact on these strata According to Rodrik, it 
increa.ses inequality between labor market groups that can cross international borders - 
owners o f capital, highly skilled workers, some professionals - and those that cannot, 
especially unskilled and semiskilled workers While this increasing class effect of 
globalization may fuel populist calls for protectionism it also stimulates demands for 
compensation in the form of social insurance Indeed, Rodrik demonstrates that government
spending on forms of social security and welfare is in fact highest in those countries most 
exposed to significant amounts o f external trade risk, where it helps buy social peace
But if globalization increases the importance of social insurance, it also makes such 
spending more difficult to sustain The globalization of financial markets has made it harder 
for national governments to control monetary and fiscal policy, while Keynesian demand 
management solutions are made more difficult when firms are increasingly oriented towards 
global rather than nationally based markets As Wright argues, “the realization of the 
economic value of those commodities depends less upon the purchasing power of workers in 
the countries within which those firms are located
Many neoliberal prescriptions may make matters worse, such as those that weaken 
state institutions, or polices that erode social welfare expenditure in the face of the increased 
unemployment generated by adjustment Rampant economic liberalization, leads to a 
decline in consumption, which not only undermines attempts to consolidate democracy, but 
with a decline in state capacity may lead to social disintegration, descending into 
“decentralized collective violence.”*^ Rodrik warns economists and policymakers that they 
ignore this political - and we would argue, class - dimension of globalization, at their peril as 
increasing international economic integration may lead to increasing domestic social 
disintegration Globalization thus may generate conditions that undermine the 
international and domestic social orders on which its own reproduction depends.
However if globalization creates constraints, it would be a mistake to claim that it 
eliminates choice and removes maneuvering room for stales. The challenge is to construct, 
amidst constraints, what Linz and Stepan call “mixed economies.” For them, democracy 
cannot be consolidated in either command economies or in completely free markets, but 
depends upon states that can regulate markets; correct market failures; and generate “public 
goods in the areas of education, health...transportation, some safety net for its citizens hurt 
by major market swings, and some alleviation of gross inequality...”*''
It is similarly easy, in discussions of globalization, to ignore constraints on capital and 
assume a frictionless mobility by equating all capital with financial capital Many firms are 
relatively immobile and employers may not only be profit-maximizers, but also risk-avoiders 
interested in steady, long-term, and sustainable profit A number of analysts, most notably 
Albert, identity these features, among others, as distinguishing Germany - the "other 
capitalism” - from the dominant American m odel" Such approaches stress the importance 
of embeddedness; specific domestic configurations of organizations, institutions, and norms 
which mediate and shape a country’s interaction with the international economy.'* In 
essence, the impact o f markets on domestic economies is not uniform as these domestic 
interactions may expand the universe o f choices open to policy makers, while limiting options 
the state and capital might otherwise have chosen Markets constrain choices, but do not 
predetermine outcomes
Our interest in these organizations and institutions rests with the possibilities they 
present for reconciling democracy and economic reconstruction through bargaining, which 
implies reaching non-zero-sum enforceable agreements between independent actors based on 
mutually accepted rules We call this “bargained liberalization”: /iheralization, because the 
changes involve opening up to the global economy, haigai/icJ, because agreements are 
subject to the institutionally structured interplay of societal interests Bargained liberalization 
may provide workers and marginalized social strata with an opportunity to engage the state 
and capital over the form and pace of adjustment, allowing the extension of some measure of 
social regulation to those whose livelihoods are threatened by economic restructuring
The class effects of globalization and neoliberal restructuring suggests the importance 
of searching for class compromises that could mediate these pressures and establish a more 
stable basis for both democracy and growth Yet with the decline of western European 
corporatism and third world developmental states the idea of class compromise - indeed, of 
the very notion of societal bargaining - has fallen into some disfavor We now turn to a 
discussion of class compromise, in its “northern” and much neglected “southern” forms, and 
the possibilities o f class compromise in the current context
B. The “Northern Compromise” in Advanced Industrial Societies
In advanced industrial societies democracy was consolidated through a class 
compromise based on an exchange between capital and labor In return for capital providing 
economic concessions to labor (high wages, full employment, social welfare) labor accepted 
the capitalist system and in particular capital’s prerogative to manage the enterprise That a 
rising standard of living and full employment could be delivered through the institutions of a . 
democratic capitalist state led workers to develop an interest in defending and maintaining the 
institutions that willy nilly bolstered capitalism Capital was willing to make such 
concessions in return for favorable conditions for capital accumulation; it too, developed an 
interest in maintaining democratic institutions. Underpinning this “northern compromise,” 
then, was a strong investor response to growing demand fueled by rises in wages and full 
employment As Glyn argues, wages and employment grew simultaneously in a virtuous 
circle linked by high investment levels, increasing productivity, and rising wages, resolving - 
temporarily - competition between the employed and the unemployed.”
In historical perspective this class compromise was made possible by a series of 
contingent factors: tbe development of Keynesian macroeconomic demand management, the 
Pax Americana, and Fordist production systems supported by corporatist-style labor relations 
systems '* It also depended upon a labor movement organizationally capable of attaining 
optimal militancy: too much militancy meant that accumulation would be too slow, and 
ultimately material benefits would be reduced, too little militancy meant that accumulation 
would take place without capital making any concessions ' '
Since the 1970s the conditions underpinning the northern compromise eroded, and 
with them many of labor’s gains have been rolled back In particular, it has been argued, that 
the consequences of the new global economy undermine any possibility of a nationally based 
class compromise on the lines forged during the “Golden Age” of capitalism “
Globalization has encouraged the view among many analysts that class compromise 
per se is no longer possible, and that discussion of the concept is pointless We do not reject 
the argument that globalization constrains domestic policy choices, and renders unworkable 
any simple return to the postwar historic compromise Nonetheless, we take issue with the 
notion that a class compromise was a western European post-war phenomenon, and its 
corollary, that the erosion of the conditions that made the specific compromise pos,sible 
means the end of the possibility of class compromises in general In a recent paper, Wrigbt 
resuscitates discussion of compromise, which he defines as:
a non-zero-sum game between workers and capitalists in which both parties can 
improve their position through various forms of positive mutual cooperation rather 
than simply from refraining from hurting each other 
Wright’s definition implies that a compromise remains a logical possibility between capital 
and labor; it was never sui generis to Europe, nor to the specific conditions of the immediate 
post-war period
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Arguments against the likelihood of a contemporary class compromise thus ignore 
that they were also struck outside of the specific conditions of western Europe, and continue 
to be constructed in a fashion today. Indeed, many argue that globalization in fact makes 
such compromises necessary, although their terms must be different from the historic 
compromise of the post-war period According to some analysts, such compromises have 
reemerged in the 1990s in western Europe, where globalization and increased competition are 
making it difficult for companies to compete only on product quality and flexibility; 
containment o f labor costs has regained prominence. Where labor movements are strong, this 
has been achieved through tripartite income policies and a variety of pacts where labor’s 
compromises on wages are matched by capital’s commitment to invest^^
A second example is the manner in which welfare states in Europe and elsewhere 
have responded to globalization. According to Esping-Andersen, a number of countries have 
retained generous egalitarian social protection with a relatively inflexible labor market, rather 
than following the American model o f deregulation and flexibility. There is a seemingly 
universal trade-off between equality and employment: in the United States rising employment 
has been combined with greater job flexibility and increasing polarization and poverty, while 
in many European countries high levels of social protection has been retained side-by-side 
with growing unemployment.“
A final example of continued possibilities for class compromise is defined by Rogers 
and Streeck as “left productivism”  Their argument builds from the increased influence 
workers may be able to acquire under conditions of “flexible specialization.” At the center 
of their argument is a search for “a post-Keynesian equivalent of effective demand where the 
alchemy will have to come on the supply side, in production rather than consumption This 
is to be found in
a left policy of effective supply [that] defends the welfare state as an indispensable 
instrument for imposing high and egalitarian labor standards on a capitalist economy, 
as well as for equalizing and enhancing the productive capacities o f individuals and 
organizations, in both ways improving the economy’s performance potential^'
Wright reiterates this position, but adds an important qualification: that a stable productivist 
class compromise requires high levels o f working class associational power, without which 
workers are unlikely to have trust and confidence in employers’ behavior that would ensure 
robust cooperation Furthermore, such pacts
can have a more restricted scope in which the beneficial effects become contained 
within specific firms and sectors, increasing tendencies towards economic dualism in 
which economic inequality between insiders and outsiders is intensified^*
If this is a problem in advanced industrial societies, it is more so in developing countries 
where there are often more “outsiders” than “insiders ” We will return to this theme below 
In summary, class compromise as a general phenomenon should not be contlated with 
the specific corporatist form that it took in western Europe after the second world war, nor 
should the possibilities for compromise be tied to the fate o f corporatism Indeed, analysts 
have shown not only that there was considerable variety in corporatist arrangements, but that 
in many instances these continue to operate (albeit with changes in form and substantive 
content) in the 1990s.”  Moreover, welfare provisions, income and “left productivist” policies 
are not only compatible with globalization, but may be instrumental in finding a new balance 
between market and society to stave off “domestic social disintegration”
C. The “Southern Comproniise”in Developing Countries
At the same moment that the historic compromise in advanced industrial societies was 
being forged, a parallel compromise emerged in developing countries in the wake of 
decolonization However, the configuration of classes and the key actors that brought about 
the “southern compromise” were different Whereas in advanced industrial societies the 
compromise was essentially an exchange between organized capital and organized labor, in 
the third world the compromise was struck between tbe state, urban classes and class 
fractions (including workers, the informal sector, the unemployed) and domestic and 
international capital. According to Walton and Seddon, this “developmental pact” was a 
“class coalition of industrial and export interests that paid the price of social peace with 
concessions to the urban masses ” *^ These programs:
implied a bargain between the state and the urban poor. Public assistance was 
provided in exchange for political loyalty The new urban groups were expected not 
only to refrain from embarrassing protest demonstrations, but to turn out in support of 
the state on ceremonial occasions and election day to channel their demand-making 
through the instrumentalities of government or the ruling party ,”
Two important points arise from this pact First, the social structure of the labor force 
differed from that of the northern advanced industrialized societies Where the latter was 
composed largely of full-time permanently employed workers (represented in the main by 
national industrial unions) in the south a multiplicity o f classes and class fractions existed 
urban workers, the informal sector, the unemployed, small entrepreneurs, peasants. The 
industrial working class was a minority, while trade unions did not often represent the 
majority of workers - let alone other strata - and were not always the principal agent o f the 
southern compromise. Thus the second point is that the pact was driven by the 
developmentalist state, not the organized associations of capital and labor. Indeed, the state’s 
involvement in the pact often led to the subordination of organized labor, a phenomenon 
captured in Schmitter’s well-known distinction between societal and state corporatism
The southern compromise, like its northern counterpart, was underpinned by the same 
configuration of post-war political and economic conditions, and changes in these conditions 
led to its unraveling from the 1970s. However, the problems in the south took a much 
sharper form The debt crisis into which many developmental states were plunged from the 
mid-1970s led to the now familiar IMF-inspired adjustment programs, which in turn often 
prompted large-scale collective protest actions These “austerity protests” were not simply a 
response to a decline in material conditions, but must be understood as a moral reaction to a 
breach in the southern compromise As Walton and Seddon argue.
Governments were blamed for sacrificing their own citizens in the interests o f foreign 
banks. Protestors demanded that the state meet its responsibilities to the people who, 
during the decades o f patron-client politics, had upheld their end of the bargain 
The austerity protests drew to their ranks a multiplicity of social groups from the urban poor 
most seriously affected by the economic crisis: shanty-dwellers, unemployed youths, street 
vendors and organized workers *' In many cases these groups were allied to other disafTected 
segments o f the population, including students, teachers, public employees, shopkeepers, 
professionals and church groups This moral struggle against the violation of the southern 
compromise discredited state corporatist regimes and fueled many of the pro-democracy 
movements o f the 1980s and 1990s, leading in some cases to the toppling of national 
governments, as in the Philippines, Poland, and Zambia
The crisis o f the southern compromise led to two distinct, but interlinked projects:
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democratization to replace the authoritarian political regime and economic restructuring to 
replace the statist and protectionist economic regime However there are conflicting views on 
the relationship between political and economic reform An optimistic perspective sees these 
as necessary and complementary, and raises political conditionality to an equal status with 
economic adjustment.
A more skeptical reading of these two processes emphasizes the contradictions 
between them. The latter produces winners and losers while the former gives voice - and the 
capacity to block change - to well-organized interests threatened by liberalization. If there 
must be a choice between economic and political liberalization, some argue preference should 
be given to the former.^^ To overcome these special interests, Killick argues for the 
“insulation of policy-makers from pressures exerted by special interest groups In this 
sense insulation means protection from special interest groups - such as trade unions - who 
bear the brunt of adjustment, even if it means abandoning democracy For Callaghy 
insulation represents the “democratic lltnctional equivalents” of authoritarian rule which may 
restrain the organized interests from derailing sustained neoclassical reform.”
Others, in acknowledging this contradiction, argue instead that if a choice is to be 
made it should be on the side of democracy, both formal and substantive They reject both 
the easy abandonment o f democracy and the shrunken version of it embraced by many 
political scientists This position, put forward by many critics of structural adjustment in 
Africa, seeks to embrace more participatory forms of democracy and alternative forms of 
economic development focused on basic needs.”
Indeed, the scholars associated with the recent study. Sustainable Democracy 
(hereafter, Przeworski, et al.), stress the tension between political and economic reform as 
the key problem facing new democracies, but insist that it is best resolved through 
democratic institutions/’ New democracies, the authors argue, must find ways of creating 
“incentives for political forces to process their interests within the democratic institutions, 
when material conditions continue to deteriorate.””
But whereas the pessimists see democratic institutions as creating little more than an 
obstacle to economic reform, Przeworski et al. argue they are necessary for economic 
restructuring, but restructuring of a different type: a social democratic alternative to neo­
liberalism that in our assessment amounts to a class compromise. This consists of three 
recommendations. First, liberalization must be accompanied by social policies that 
minimize social costs. Second, policies must be designed with a view towards growth 
(including expanding and strengthening the state). Finally, policies must be formulated and 
implemented through corporatist-style consultation and negotiation beyond the state and 
parliament to include unions, employers and other interest groups.”  “Concertation” is 
central to their argument: it subjects the reform strategy to the competitive interplay of 
political forces, improves policy outcomes, builds support (legitimacy) for the reforms atid 
their continuation, and thereby helps consolidate democratic institutions.'"
Surprisingly, the same authors are largely silent about the possibility of a social 
democratic alternative being realized in most countries undergoing double transitions.'*' 
Consolidation of democracy, they argue, depends on strong union organizations that can 
participate in pacting, reaching and enforcing agreements with capital and the state. Yet, 
the authors assert that concertation is impossible because unions “are too weak and too 
decentralized to serve as partners...”*’ The implications of this conclusion for the 
consolidation of democracy are, to be sure, distinctly troubling.
This need not be the case. Underlying their conclusion is a set o f assumptions about
the social actors who will produce this class compromise: that labor in a particular form 
(centralized, industrial, encompassing) delivered the northern compromise in Europe, and its 
absence makes class compromises per se impossible On the one hand, these assumptions 
mis-read the dynamics of trade unions in countries undergoing the double transition. Labor 
movements are emerging in countries such as South Korea, Brazil and South Africa that have 
the power to stalemate liberalization and are increasingly demanding the rights to bargain 
over its terms and pace Though nowhere do these movements approach the power wielded 
by labor in Sweden during the heyday of social democracy, this should not be taken to mean 
that their influence is zero. On the other hand Przeworski et al overlook the fact that class 
compromises have been constructed by a variety of collective actors, including left parties, 
often in alliance with trade unions and other social movements, such as women’s 
organizations and cooperative societies. Rather than lamenting the absence of northern 
po,stwar corporatist-type configurations, those interested in class compromise should look 
instead at a variety o f coalitions that may be capable of producing it in some form
An important example of the successful politics of class compromise is from the south 
Indian state of Kerala In the late 1980s and early 1990s a class compromise was forged by an 
alliance of popular organizations led by the Communist Party (CPM), which linked “the state 
with a mobilized working class in a developmental pact that has prioritized redistributive and 
welfarist reforms.” ’^ The compromise has institutionalized working class power, including 
the right of workers to claim a share of the social surplus through the welfare state.
Rather than representing a privileged segment o f the workforce, labor - In its broad 
alliance with the CPM and other organizations - includes the working class as a whole cutting 
across traditional urban-rural and skilled-unskilled divisions The unions’ ties to the CPM 
create a cohesive and politically oriented labor movement
In the late 1980s the movement shifted from a tradition o f militant class struggle 
focused on economistic wage demands and traditional welfarist redistribution, which had 
become economically unsustainable. In its place the movement sought to locate its 
redistributive demands on a more viable productive base through a larger social pact “in 
which growth was tied to the expansion of the social wage”  Side-by-side with this shift from 
“class struggle” to “class compromise” was a strategic engagement with capital and the state 
in a negotiated compromise that incorporated working class power within the state Heller 
calls this compromise a form of democratic corporatism where working class power “finds 
expression through, and not outside of democratic institutions” "
The Kerala case illustrates an alternative view that popular movements such as labor 
have the potential to reconfigure democratization through participation in negotiated 
compromises. Class compromises have the potential to discipline capital and the state and 
ensure that the social costs of adjustment are not borne by workers alone. Compromise 
should not be seen simply as a way of disciplining workers, but as a conflictual process, the 
results of which may produce workers’ loyalty to democratization while ameliorating the 
social costs of adjustment.
The Kerala case also suggests that a class compromise is possible where resources are 
limited and capital cannot extend significant economic concessions to the working class 
However its form and content may not resemble either the northern compromise or its statist 
southern counterpart. The compromise may be produced by many possible configurations of 
organizations, and that these will vary depending on historical and institutional context The 
substantive terms o f the compromise will differ from both the postwar historic compromise in 
Europe and the developmentalist pact in the third world it is not based on high wages and
high labor standards for organized workers, but on two different kinds of compromises First, 
it includes the introduction of a social wage to all citizens - what could be called a form of 
social citizenship - consisting o f the right to income security, other forms of welfare such as 
education, health, and shelter; a right to share to the full in the social heritage, and the right to 
live in a safe environment. This compromise allows for both the productivist effect of social 
welfare identified by Rogers and Streeck, and a modest redistributive mechanism for the poor 
and unemployed and some compensation for those workers who have made wage and labor 
standards concessions For the latter, it allows cuts in nominal wages without unduly 
sacrificing workers’ real standard of living.
The second compromise provides workers and their representatives with increased 
influence over investment decisions and productivity gains, to ensure that surpluses generated 
by growth benefit the population as a whole. This could be done at the workplace and 
industry levels through forms of co-determination, while at societal level it could be achieved 
through agreements over macroeconomic policy that encourage growth and redistribution In 
this compromise the state ensures that labor gains increased control over the distribution of 
the surplus and that this is used - through social welfare - in the interests of the population as 
a whole Capital gains a more productive workforce and flexibility conducive to job creation, 
while committing itself to longer-term productive investment The state achieves economic 
growth, increased tax revenues, and stability These interlocking concessions and gains are a 
way to resolve the potential contradictions of the double transition.
Such a compromise must be negotiated through a range of multi-partite institutions at 
the micro, meso and macro levels In Part 11 of the paper we identify fhe emergence of a 
range of institufional innovations that provide important means for achieving a class 
compromise in South Africa But the compromise also requires collective actors willing and 
able to make concessions. The constraints and opportunities facing these actors will be 
identified in Part 111.
II. INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS FOR CLASS COMPROMISE: THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN CASE
The South African transition has been marked by a range of major institutional 
innovations which we believe have laid the foundations for a class compromise, though this 
does not mean such possibilities will be realized These institutions originated in the 
stalemate that emerged during the transition to democracy in which civil society formations 
were in many instances able to block unilateral restructuring of the economy by the apartheid 
state and capital The institutions created new rules of the game compelling the key social 
actors - government, organized labor, business, and community-based organizations - to 
bargain over liberalization by negotiating and concluding agreements on major economic and 
social policies.^’
A. Foundations of the New Labor Regime
For most o f this century South Africa had a dualislic system of industrial relations: a 
legalistic set ot bargaining rights for non-black workers (whites, coloureds, and Indians) 
while black workers were excluded and subjected to varieties of formal and informal 
repression This system received its most fundamental challenge in the 1970s with the 
emergence ot independent shop-floor based industrial unions of black workers based largely 
in the import-substituting industries stimulated by South Africa’s 1960s economic expansion 
These unions concentrated on winning recognition at plant level, which entailed both
organizational rights (election of and time off for shop stewards, access for union officials) 
and sub.stantive rights (bargaining on wages and working conditions, defense of workers in 
dismissals and retrenchments) Part of the unions’ demands stressed amendment o f the then- 
existing Labour Relations Act (LRA) which excluded African workers from the category of 
employee, thus preventing them from participating in industry-based collective bargaining
The dualistic system began breaking down in the 1970s, under pressure from the 
growing union movement and its international trade union allies, and from many sections of 
South African capital who feared increasing and unregulated conflict on the shop floor/*'’ In 
1977, in the aftermath of the 1976 Soweto uprising and the system-wide challenge it posed to 
apartheid, the government set up the Wiehahn Commission of enquiry to investigate the 
industrial relations system. Two years later, in an attempt to control the emerging unions, the 
Wiehahn Commission recommended that the LRA be amended to incorporate black workers 
by encouraging their unions to register, but only if they would confine themselves to 
collective bargaining issues.
Rather than incorporating these unions into the existing industrial relations system, 
however, these reforms opened up a process through which the unions were able to transform 
the system from within Initially by registering they were able to legitimize their presence 
and rapidly expand their membership By demanding the right of recognition at shop floor 
level - backed up by the disciplined use of collective power - they were able to win extensive 
bargaining rights that encroached on existing managerial prerogatives: wage setting, 
discipline and dismissal, retrenchment, work reorganization Organizational power enabled 
unions to shift the “frontier o f control” at plant level, thereby providing a base from which to 
demand industry-level bargaining, which was slowly won in key sectors
After the mass political resistance of the mid-1980s had been suppressed in successive 
states of emergency, both capital and the state sought to reverse labor’s gains by amending the 
LRA However their efforts provoked widespread union resistance at workplace and national 
levels The unions organized three national stayaways [general strikes] in 1988 and 1989 and 
refused to service their members in disputes under the new LRA’s provisions Faced by 
growing disorder on the shopfloor many companies began searching for common interests 
with organized labor, yielding a series of bilateral negotiations between labor and business 
culminating in a tripartite agreement - the Laboria Minute - on the basic contours o f a new 
labor relations system.”  The three parties agreed: that all future labor laws would be 
considered by employers’ bodies and the trade union movement prior to being put before 
parliament, that the unions would participate in a reconstructed National Manpower 
Commission (NMC, a statutory con,sultative body on labor relations and labor market issues 
set up by the Wiehahn Commission and boycotted by the new labor movement); and that 
labor rights would be extended to those previously excluded from the industrial relations 
system, including farm and dome.stic workers, as well as public servants
The Laboria Minute was a crucial - though little appreciated - moment in the 
transition to democracy as a whole In part the agreement was itself made possible by the 
transition: by the late 1980s labor repression was not an option for the National Party 
government, which was already engaged in secret talks with the African National Congress 
(ANC). The ,\NC, South Africa's strongest and olde.st liberation movement, had been 
banned in I960 and was operating in exile. In 1989 the National Party government had taken 
the first tentative steps towards regularizing politics by unbanning key opposition leaders, and 
the following year had legalized the ANC, which in 1994 became the leading party in South 
Africa’s first democratically elected government
More importantly, in terms of the transition as a whole, the Laboria Minute was the 
first example o f a major policy issue being addressed by means of a negotiated compromise 
between the state and representative organizations, where a societal stalemate was processed 
through institutions Furthermore, the Laboria Minute was struck prior to the pacting 
between the political actors on the political, military and constitutional aspects o f the 
transition. It set up a practice of tripartism giving labor an institutionalized voice enabling it 
to shape the broader transition agenda. As important, it prevented labor’s fate being 
determined solely in a constitution-making process between political parties, which could not 
easily overturn or trade away tripanite agreements Most o f the institutional innovations 
outlined below grew out of the Laboria Minute.
B. Institutional Arrangements 
Labour Relations Act
In 1994 one of the first moves by the new democratically elected government was to 
establish a legal task team to draft a new Labour Relations Act. After a prolonged bargaining 
process the Act was formally passed by parliament at the end of 1996.
The LRA has four key features For the first time in South African labor history all 
workers were brought under the ambit o f one industrial relations system. In addition to 
public service workers this includes the most marginalized, including farm laborers and 
domestic workers The new Act promoted collective bargaining by providing organizational 
rights for unions in the workplace, thereby entrenching in law what many unions struggled to 
achieve through private agreement: access to employer premises; meeting rights, union 
subscription facilities It entrenched the right to strike with a clear right to picket, while the 
labor movement blocked capital’s insistence on a lock-out clause However, the Act 
encouraged parties to resolve disputes through conciliation and arbitration and created a new 
institution for this purpose, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(CCMA) Finally, and its most significant innovation, was provision for joint decision­
making and consultation at shop floor level between management and workers through the 
creation o f workplace forums, developed in part from South African and western European 
precedents
Institutional Engagement at the Meso-Level: Industry Level Bargaining
The hardest bargaining on liberalization emerged in those sectors of the economy 
most exposed to the impact o f globalization: mining, clothing and textiles, motor and 
components, and the state-owned corporations in the public sector From 1991 unions took 
the lead in creating institutional forums where bargaining over the terms of liberalization 
could take place
Among the first o f these was a “mining summit” called by the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) in 1991 Faced by mounting job losses the union called for a social 
plan to manage the gradual downscaling of the industry The NUM’s proposed plan included 
minimizing job losses by prolonging the life of marginal mines, generating alternative forms 
of employment by encouraging beneficiation; and cushioning the effects o f retrenchment 
through counseling and retraining "  Little progress was made on these ideas until 1998 when 
the steeply declining gold price put job loss and the need for a follow-up summit back on the 
agenda A new Gold Crisis Committee was launched to manage downscaling "
Similar summits took place in the motor and in the clothing and textile industries In 
the latter, the South African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (SACTWU) understood
that in the face of liberalization it would be unable to sustain its members’ jobs and wages 
unless these were linked to an industrial policy oriented towards growth and adjustment In a 
context where the government was illegitimate and clothing and textile employers 
fundamentally divided, the union became the beat er o f the public interest in industrial 
regeneration. Their package included defensive measures to protect those threatened by job 
loss, such as retraining and wage subsidies to those retrenched; active policies, including 
incentives to industry to develop and deploy new technology, modernizing management, and 
small business development; and policies oriented to the extension o f union power, such as a 
commitment by employers to centralized bargaining In this context - and only in this broader 
context - SACTWU was willing to negotiate on phased reductions in tariff barriers and 
“stability” in the workplace.*"
The third example of meso-level bargained liberalization was labor’s response to the 
ANC government’s announcement in December 1995 that it intended privatizing important 
state assets. The unions organizing workers in parastatals demanded the right to negotiate the 
terms of restructuring with the state After intensive discussions between labor and senior 
government ministers both parties accepted a National Framework Agreement (NFA) on the 
restructuring of state assets In terms of the NFA all specific instances of restructuring must 
be negotiated between government and the relevant parties according to broad principles 
Furthermore, the government agreed that restructuring would not be done at the expense of 
employment, and where there were job losses, a social plan would be negotiated *'
The final example of industry-level restructuring comes from the public service where 
centralized bargaining was established for the first time in 1993 Importantly, the functions of 
the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council go well beyond traditional collective 
bargaining to include qualitative non-distributive issues such as work organization as well as 
the restructuring of the public service itself To the extent that the public service is a central 
actor in liberalization - either to be “downsized ” or restructured - workers therefore have 
important influence over the character of change in the institution.”
Institutional Engagement at the Societal Level: NEDLAC
In the Laboria Minute the unions agreed to participate in the then-discredited National 
Manpower Commission, while government agreed to seek consultation on important 
economic policies. However, little progress was made on either count Labor's 
recommendations for restructuring the NMC made little headway with government, while 
government did not take seriously the commitment to consultation. These problems came to 
a head in late 1991 when government announced - without prior consultation - a new and 
regressive Value Added Tax (VAT), designed in part with assistance from international 
financial institutions. Labor responded by organizing a wide array of formations that 
participated in a two-day stayaway against the new tax, led by the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), the largest and most politically sophisticated labor federation in 
the country Since its formation in 1985 it has been aligned with the ANC and the South 
African Communist Party (SACP), the “triple alliance” which was formally inaugurated after 
the unbanning o f political organizations in 1990
Through their struggles over VAT it became clear to labor leaders that merely 
delaying the new tax would not protect worker interests in the face of wide-spread and 
unilateral restructuring o f the economy Furthermore, their lack of success with the NMC 
motivated labor strategists to seek a new general fomm where economic and social policy 
could be debated and negotiated in a more systematic manner In the aftermath ot the anti-
VAT campaign COSATU prioritized the creation o fa  multipartite National Economic Forum 
(NEF).”
The NEF operated as a multipartite forum between 1992 and 1994, parallel to and 
separate from the main constitutional negotiations, and struck agreements on a number of 
contentious economic and social policy issues.** However, the NEF was essentially a 
transitional arrangement that emerged in the context of an illegitimate government where 
negotiated agreements nonetheless had to be reached between the state, capital and labor
With the election of a democratic government the NEF’s status was uncertain Would 
a new government attempt to reclaim sovereignty over economic policy or would some form 
ot bargaining over these issues become a more permanent feature of the new regime? 
Significantly, the key architects ofCOSATU’s NEF strategy were now either in ministerial 
positions or were serving as advisors to government Taking advantage o f their positions - 
and in the absence of any serious opposition to a bargained approach - they quickly proposed 
the merging of the NMC’s labor law and labor market agenda with the macroeconomic 
concerns of the NEF
The new body, the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), 
was located in the Department o f Labour and charged with the task of reaching consensus 
between government, organized labor, organized employers and other community-based 
interest groups on all significant economic and social policy before legislation goes to 
parliament. This latter category was an important innovation that potentially offered voice to 
marginalized groups, such as the unemployed, disabled, youth, and women, thus avoiding a 
narrow corporatism based on the “golden triangle” of state, labor and capital”  One o f the 
first pieces of legislation passed by the new government was the NEDLAC Act o f 1994 
NEDLAC is thus a statutory body, consisting o f four chambers: labor market, public finance 
and monetary policy; trade and industry; and development
Each of the institutions discussed above provides labor with the access to shaping 
fundamental development policies at the micro, meso and macro levels In terms o f their 
content and their breadth these institutional innovations are remarkable in comparison with 
other countries undergoing the “double transition”. As such they provide part o f the basis for 
a broad class compromise in which development policies are not defined on the terms of local 
and global capital alone, but instead are the outcome of genuine bargaining Indeed, the 
Labour Market Commission, appointed by President Mandela, proposed a social pact in 1996 
and subsequent discussion in NEDLAC led to the acceptance of a “Jobs Summit” to produce 
an accord on employment and growth. “  In Part III we identify - through an analysis o f the 
key actors who would be party to such a class compromise - the opportunities and constraints 
o f achieving such an agreement
III. TOWARDS A CLASS COMPROMISE: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CONSTRAINTS
A. From Left-Keynesianism to Fiscal Austerity
Although the South African government’s current macroeconomic policy is guided by 
a neoliberal framework, the Growth Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) its 
apparent hegemony conceals the persistence of a powerful letl-Keynesian orientation to 
economic and social policy debates in the democratic movement dating back to the late 
1980s This approach can be identified with two separate, but linked projects The first was a 
policy intervention based among groups of progressive academic economists who established 
the Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG) to develop a framework for macroeconomic
policy in South Africa.”  MERG envisioned a two-phased “crowding-in” growth strategy for 
South Africa;
A state-led social and physical investment program as the growth driver in the first 
phase, followed by a more sustainable growth phase which would see private sector 
investment kick in more forceflilly as growth picked up 
However, in spite o f the fact that MERG was initiated by the ANC’s Department of 
Economic Policy and that it developed the furthest articulation of a left-Keynesian program, 
its policy recommendations were never adopted by the democratic movement
The second project - the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) - 
overlapped with MERG in terms of personnel and policy prescriptions, but came out of 
COSATU. The RDP originated in an attempt by labor to produce an accord that would tie a 
newly elected ANC government to a labor-driven development program. In 1993 and 1994 a 
number of intellectuals based in the unions and NGOs developed successive drafts of a policy 
framework In its final formulation, the RDP envisioned as a first priority “beginning to meet 
the basic needs o f people: jobs, land, housing, water, electricity, telecommunications, 
transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health care, and social welfare.”’ ’
While the RDP was in gestation a set o f local and international pressures were 
profoundly changing economic thinking in the ANC From the 1950s the ANC was publicly 
committed to a state-interventionist redistributive strategy, as articulated in its central policy 
document, the Freedom Charter’s commitment to nationalization This policy was publicly 
reconfirmed by Nelson Mandela on his release from prison in February 1990 The ANC’s 
standard developmentalist pottition - consistent with the “southern compromise” - had by the 
late 1980s and early 1990s come under substantial pressure If Mandela had entered prison at 
a time when nationalization was an article o f faith, he was released into a world where 
monetarism and its obsession with inflation and the reduction in state expenditure had 
become the new orthodoxy.'’”
From 1990 there were a series of economic policy reversals through which the ANC 
leadership came to adopt positions increasingly consistent with the neoliberal orthodoxy By 
late 1993 the ANC had made a number of concessions in macroeconomic policy. They 
accepted a clause in the constitution that guaranteed the independence of the Reserve Bank 
and agreed to retain its highly conservative governor. They also agreed to retain the NP- 
appointed Minister of Finance. Finally, in November 1993 - at precisely the moment when 
MERG was releasing its left-Keynesian policy framework - the ANC concluded a secret $850 
million loan agreement with the IMF. In return for the loan the ANC agreed; not to ease 
monetary policy; to prioritize inflation reduction; to contain government expenditure (indeed 
to cap the debt/GDP ratio and to reduce it progressively in subsequent years); and not to raise 
taxes.”'
These agreements were not in keeping with the thinking of both the MERG and the 
groups drafting the RDP, which was proceeding through its final drafts Upon its release the 
MERG essentially disappeared; it was no longer consistent with the ANC’s macroeconomic 
policy reversal The RDP however, was central to the ANC’s electoral strategy and could not 
simply be abandoned, above all because it was being promoted by COSATU. Instead it was 
amended to make it more consistent with the new position. In particular, its macroeconomic 
orientation was redefined away from the unions’ commitment to “growth through 
redistribution” (an important emphasis in MERG) to a direction more attractive to domestic 
and international capital, with commitments to fiscal discipline and macroeconomic balance
The redrafted RDP was sharply criticized on both procedural and substantive grounds
al a special COSATU congress held in August 1993 The redraft was presented for adoption 
without being debated within COSATU structures, and its content had been changed to 
include a statement that “coherent, strict, and eftective monetary and fiscal policies will be a 
cornerstone of our RDP.”“  Many in COSATU saw the re-formulation constraining - if not 
undermining - the possibilities for a left-Keynesian project as envisioned by both MERG and 
the RDP authors. However, COSATU adopted the program without suggesting an alternative 
to this call for fiscal discipline at the heart o f the RDP The RDP soon became the paradigm 
within which all development policies were to be discussed, an extended wish list in which 
the homeless, the landless, workers, bankers and opposition politicians could take some 
comfort. In other words, it became all things to all people
From 1994 to 1996 the RDP became ostensibly the guiding document o f the 
Government o f National Unity, located in an RDP Office within the President’s Office, under 
the immediate authority o f Minister Without Portfolio Jay Naidoo - ex-General Secretary of 
COSATU Within months the alliance’s election document was redrafted into a white paper 
However, the principles and programmatic objectives of the original RDP were 
reconceptualised as a long-term strategic vision to realign all government effort around 
clearly stated economic targets, leaving little room for labor-, or indeed civil society-driven 
change “
Furthermore, the macroeconomic shift noted above became even more pronounced as 
the white paper significantly strengthened the emphasis on fiscal discipline that first appeared 
in the draft presented to the 1993 COSATU special congress. It developed a more robust 
commitment to an export-led growth strategy while loosening the RDP’s original emphasis 
on basic needs, stressing instead reducing state expenditure, privatization, and promoting 
private sector expansion.
In the first year and a half o f the new government, the two parallel thrusts - left 
Keynesianism and macroeconomic conservatism ran parallel to each other, leading to a 
muddle in government policy This confusion was heightened by a measure of ineptitude in 
the RDP office, and rivalry between it, the Department of Finance, and the Department of 
Labour which had begun implementing a labor-friendly legislative agenda, focused on the 
new LRA, NEDLAC, and labor market reform
B. Contestation over Economic Policy
The first major public contestation over the iieoliberal shift occurred in December
1995, when the government announced its intentions to privatize important state assets 
Labor responded by threatening a general strike and demanded the right to negotiate the terms
"  of restructuring After intensive discussions between the NEDLAC Labour Caucus'”* and
senior government ministers, the National Framework Agreement was accepted in Febmary
1996. But while labor challenged an important element in government policy, and had won 
important concessions, it had not yet developed an alternative macroeconomic framework
instead, in January 1996 business opened the public debate on economic policy with a 
document advocating a standard neoliberal solution: economic deregulation, dramatic 
reductions in the deficit, trade liberalization in the form of lower tariffs; rapid privatization, 
lower corporate taxes; and increased labor market flexibility to be achieved through dual 
labor market p o lic ie s .S o o n  after business’ document was published, COSATU released an 
alternative - and rushed - plan. “Social Equity and Job Creation,” inspired by lefl-Keynesian 
thinking that became the common position in the NEDLAC Labour Caucus The plan 
attacked neoliberalism and proposed instead a public and private investment policy geared
towards job creation and growth Central to the strategy was an active industrial policy to 
develop the manufacturing sector along with social adjustment measures to provide for the 
social costs o f restructuring the economy Importantly, the document proposed a 
redistributive fiscal policy based on a strongly progressive tax system to redirect spending 
towards social services for the poor The program articulated a vision of regional 
reconstruction and development tied to support for a third world debt write-off and closer 
trade union solidarity. Finally, it incorporated demands for worker participation, both at the 
shop floor in the form of union-based workplace forums and at the sectoral and national 
levels
In the meantime, the government was converting the RDP white paper into a formal 
policy, the National Growth and Development Strategy (NGDS) The NGDS continued the 
ambiguous straddling between neoliberalism and the redistributive and equity orientations of 
the original RDP However, this document was withdrawn when critics within the triple 
alliance opposed both its content and the non-consultative process by which the document 
was written, and the NGDS was never publicly released.
However, the new government's first major currency crisis - starting in February 1996 
- quickly overtook this debate, as the value of the rand plummeted by more than 25%/’" In 
this context the government moved quickly to calm domestic capital and foreign currency 
markets by embracing a conservative macroeconomic framework developed by a team of 
policy makers including senior civil servants, technocrats from the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa and the World Bank In June, after considerable internal disagreement 
within the triple alliance. Finance Minister Trevor Manuel finally released the new strategy, 
“Growth, Employment and Redistribution” (GEAR)/’’
GEAR put forward ambitious targets It aimed to achieve a “fast-growing economy 
which creates sufficient jobs for all workseekers ” It also envisioned redistribution of 
income, the provision of sound services to all, and the achievement of 6% growth and the 
creation of 400,000 jobs per annum by the year 2000/" The controversial aspect o f the plan 
was the means identified to achieve these goals Its integrated strategy highlighted fiscal 
deficit reduction, gradual relaxation of exchange controls, reduction in tariffs, tax reductions 
to encourage private sector (and especially foreign direct) investment, and restructuring of 
state assets (privatization)
Its private- (and predominantly foreign-) investment-driven model had two important 
implications First, it confirmed the high interest rate regime advocated by the conservative 
governor of the Reserve Bank Not only would this have damaging effects on consumers, but 
it would ironically constrain job creation by making productive investment more expensive 
while limiting the government’s market-driven land reform and housing programs Second, it 
placed GEAR on a collision course with the government’s own industrial relations and labor 
market policies which could now be construed as unattractive to foreign investment
The ANC sought to win support for this shift in policy within the alliance through a 
series of informal meetings with senior SACP and COSATU officials in the weeks before 
GEAR was released. ANC leaders stressed the precarious International position and the need 
to project confidence during the crisis, and argued that GEAR was the best means for doing 
this The alliance partners, while acknowledging the pressures on the government, queried 
g e a r ’s origins and were critical of the lack of consultation Indeed, the actual document 
was not tabled in the meetings; the COSATU and SACP leaders, according to one 
participant, were shown only the section headings
However once GEAR was released, the alliance partners were angered both by its
content - which they now saw for the first time - and because the government asserted that it 
was “non-negotiable,” a position reiterated by many ministers and government 
spokespersons. These two factors provoked anger from COSATU as well as from many 
figures in the SACP. COSATU General Secretary Sam Shilowa publicly criticized GEAR - 
tellingly at a seminar marking the 75th anniversary of the SACP - as an unworkable and 
unwinnable plan that would generate serious difficulties for workers and the country Most 
significantly, Shilowa identified the distance the ANC government has moved rightward from 
the original RDP by indicating that GEAR could never have emerged from the ANC before 
the 1994 elections
Despite these criticisms, GEAR was ultimately formally endorsed by the ANC’s 
National Working Committee, on which COSATU and SACP representatives sit, though both 
COSATU and the SACP rejected the policy Yet no formal agreement could be reached in 
either COSATU or the SACP on how to deal with GEAR: some felt that the policy should be 
given a chance and the government should not be attacked during a crisis, others wanted 
openly to oppose the policy The issue threatened to be divisive both within and between the 
alliance partners, as someone close to the process put it, “the debate became so shrill that 
people walked away from it.” Thus, with painful irony, what began as an accord to bind an 
ANC government to a left development program ended up ensnaring both COSATU and the 
SACP in a neoliberal-inspired macroeconomic policy
However, silence over GEAR did not mean acquiescence, and during 1997 the terrain 
became more fluid Firstly, line ministers experienced the consequences of GEAR’S fiscal 
restraint and the implications this policy held for delivering on the government’s social 
programs Secondly, GEAR has not come close to meeting its targets for employment 
creation, redistribution, growth, and foreign investment
In this context, both COSATU and the SACP became increasingly critical of GEAR 
COSATU’s 6th National Congress rejected the strategy, but did not demand that the ANC 
drop it. Privately it was argued that the policy was not cast in stone and could be successfully 
contested in many ways short o f a direct confrontation with the ANC The basis for this 
contestation came from the major document presented at COSATU’s congress, the report of 
the September Commission on the Future of Trade Unionism ”  A crucial recommendation 
in the report was that COSATU establish greater autonomy in its alliance with the ANC, 
"support the ANC when it adopts progressive policies, influence it wherever possible, and 
oppose the ANC when it adopts anti-worker’ positions
Importantly, the economic chapter o f the report, “Reclaiming Redistribution” 
contained a more systematic and considered statement of the left-Keynesian position first put 
forward in COSATU’s Social Equity document This vision includes socializing the 
investment function and building a “social sector” although the private sector remains the 
largest sector, the report recommended its transformation into a “stakeholder sector” where 
“no longer only the rights o f shareholders prevail, but also the needs o f workers, communities 
and society”  The report believed that this could best be done through strategic engagement 
with the state and capital at the enterprise, sectoral, and national levels. The report also 
recommended that union leaders commit themselves to taking a central role and responsibility 
in shaping economic and social development as well as the functioning of the public sector 
This latter was seen as “the basic foundation for translating into reality the citizenship rights 
enshrined in the constitution” through the delivery of services, the stimulation of economic 
growth and by advancing significant forms of collective ownership ”  These prescriptions 
were endorsed at COSATU’s Central Committee meeting in June 1998 and tied to a set of
alternative macroeconomic policies that called for demand-led growth, stimulated by reduced 
interest rates and more flexible policies on debt, state spending, and taxation.
The ability of COSATU and the SACP to avoid a direct confrontation with 
government over GEAR shrank considerably in 1998 GEAR failed to perform anywhere 
close to its own expectations for growth and job creation, and a further steep decline in the 
value of the rand in the middle of the year alongside dramatic interest rate increases raised the 
spectre of recession In this context both President Mandela and Deputy President Thabo 
Mbeki used high profile speeches to COSATU’s Central Committee and the SACP’s 
Congress to rebuke both organizations for questioning the government’s economic policy As 
Mandela told the SACP,
GEAR, as I have said before, is the fundamental policy of the ANC. We will not 
change it because of your pressure, if you feel you cannot get your way, then go out 
and shout like opposition parties Prepare to face the full implications of that line ™ 
This highly public dressing-down quelled open dissent in both of the ANC’s alliance partners, 
but it also made prospects for the long-awaited “Jobs Summit” - where a confrontation over 
GEAR seemed unavoidable - appear increasingly remote However the causes that were 
motivating such criticism - straightened economic circumstances, chronic 30% 
unemployment, increasing retrenchments, and attendant social dislocation - could not be 
eliminated by presidential fiat, nor could the contradictory pressures economic liberalization 
places on the consolidation o f democracy
C. Explaining the Shift in Economic Policy
If COSATU and the SACP are influential alliance partners with the ANC how did 
they come to this point of conflict over economic policy? On the face of it. South Africa is 
well-placed to resist orthodoxy. Not only was the ANC’s traditional policy orientation 
opposed to such directions, but South Africa was not suffering from an immediate debt crisis 
- indeed the country is widely regarded as "underborrowed" - which should have given the 
international financial institutions less leverage over the course of economic policy ”  Mow- 
can the shift in economic policy be explained?
The most important factor in this shift was the changing locus o f international 
influence that arose out of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the east block. Not only did 
this discredit left economic policy, it also ensured that the most important international actors 
in South Africa’s transition were to be the United States and its allies, Britain, Germany, and 
Japan The price these powers demanded for disciplining the apartheid government and 
extending promises o f material aid to the ANC was a commitment by the ANC “to embrace 
western-style free-market principles” ’*
The full opening to the west meant not only that the ANC was now for the first time 
welcome in Downing Street and the White House, but as it was increasingly perceived as the 
government-in-waiting it gained access to international financial institutions, banks and 
corporations These organizations vigorously and enthusiastically promoted neoliberal 
policies and a thick web of contacts began to develop between their representatives and ANC 
policy makers and intellectuals, particularly economists These contacts included a welter of 
private conferences and workshops as well short-term secondments of key officials to the 
World Bank, the IMF, and we.stern banks Others were invited to participate in economics 
refresher courses and graduate programs in Washington and elsewhere The new intellectual 
influences had a powerful effect on the thinking of key policymakers in the .ANC Tw o left 
economists observed that:
It was not unusual in the early 90s to hear senior ANC spokespersons arguing that the 
world had totally changed, and that those arguing for more radical or alternative 
economic solutions in this new globalised context were simply living in a bygone 
age.”
A shift in orientation was eased by the absence of a coherent left and social democratic 
economic tradition in South African political and social scientific life, what Padayachee has 
described as the “relative intellectual weakness of the progressive economics community 
“The ANC,” according to Michie and Padayachee,
did not at the beginning of negotiations possess a ready institutional capacity on the 
economic policy front to counter the power and resources available to its main 
opponents and other institutions
Though MERG was set up to meet this gap, it came too late to offset the growing relationship 
between many in the ANC and their new-found economic allies
These perspectives corresponded well with the interests o f a growing professional 
middle class and business group emerging out o f the liberation movement that stood to gain 
materially from the rightward shiff in economic policies For these strata - black and white - 
market-oriented policies delivered direct benefits through the prospect o f buying privatized 
state assets and gaining access to discounted shares in private companies. As important, 
however, these ideas helped justify their newly acquired wealth and to rationalize the 
persistence of South Africa’s highly unequal society If the new government faced 
international and domestic constraints on policy choices, the growing acceptance of market 
orientations led policy makers to interpret these “objective conditions” in particular ways and 
to suggest particular solutions.
The rapprochement between leading figures in the ANC and international capital had 
a domestic counterpart in which the movement grew closer to local capital. These links were 
forged in a fashion similar to the external connections From the late 1980s, but particularly 
after the ANC was unbanned, far-sighted South African businessmen courted black 
businessmen, intellectuals, and politicians, offering them attractive directorships and 
shareholdings in established companies. Moreover they engaged ANC leaders in a series of 
workshops and scenario planning exercises where the two sides could meet and discreetly 
discuss “options” for South Africa’s future In the process business could exert influence 
over the thinking of important leaders while simultaneously facilitating their entry into the 
ranks of the bourgeoisie For Bond this “elite compromise” determined the direction of 
macroeconomic policy in the country, redirecting it from the stated redistributive goals of the 
RDP towards a policy in the interests of dominant domestic and international class interests
There are two problems with the elite - or conservative - compromise The first is that 
it is not delivering growth (sustainable or otherwise) or generating employment, and it is not 
clear whether it can ever do so. The second is that the compromise occurred over the heads 
of those who supported the ANC during the liberation struggle and elections and who stand to 
bear the brunt o f the decline in consumption that accompanies neoliberal adjustment It is 
these groupings who were chastised by Mandela for criticizing the economic policy reversal 
In other words, these policies have generated the familiar tension identified at the outset 
between economic liberalization and the consolidation of democracy
U. From Class Stalemate to Class Compromise?
The challenge to this elite compromise has come from the labor movement and (in an 
increasingly close relationship with COSATU) the SACP, as well as a broader constituency
ot'NGOs, community organizations, and sections of the church However, these forces do 
not have the capacity to impose their alternative economic ideas on either the state or 
domestic and international capital Nor is the government and capital able to satisfy the 
economic demands of this constituency through GEAR Neither can they crush opposition
In other words. South Africa has entered a cla,ss stalemate, not dissimilar to the 
situation in Kerala in the 1970s, where neither capital nor labor are able adequately to secure 
their interests by pursuing their traditional demands through adversarial strategies and tactics 
But a class compromise is impossible unless all key actors perceive the stalemate and 
recognize the need to bargain and make concessions What would such concessions look 
like, and under what conditions might they be forthcoming'’
A class compromise must aim at a non-zero sum solution appropriate for a labor 
.surplus economy in a semi-peripheral country Such a compromise would prioritize high 
growth in which capital invests in a manner that generates sustainable jobs, without 
undermining the living standards of currently employed people As with all compromises this 
involves trade-offs for all parties
Labor’s pursuit o f high wages and high job security may in certain circumstances be 
self-defeating Inflexibility has its costs: it may encourage employers to choose labor-saving 
technology, to subcontract work, or to go off the books by employing undocumented workers 
These possibilities may lead to shell agreements where labor wins high standards on paper 
which apply to fewer and fewer workers in reality Variation must be approached with 
caution, as by itself it may lead to a downward leveling o f working and living conditions, 
with little inciease in employment. Wage stability and variation in employment conditions 
would be more likely to have the desired effects when they are combined with a social wage 
and are determined through bargaining.
The idea of a social wage seems counter-intuitive in a developing country like South 
Africa with high levels o f both poverty and inequality Nonetheless, South Africa could be 
described as a residual model o f a social welfare state, the core of which is the provision of a 
basic pension for everyone in need For example, in 1994-95 R8 billion [US$1 3 billion] was 
paid out on social pensions to 1.7 million pensioners; a .sum of R470 [USS78] per month is 
paid to all women aged 60 and over, and to all men age 6,5 and over The extent of this 
system - a legacy of the redistributive policies that bound white workers to a racist 
nationalism - is a surprise to many However, if South Africa possesses some attributes o f a 
welfare state, the challenge is to deracialise the system by breaking away from what Nattrass 
and Seekings have called “the apartheid welfare state regime”."’ This involves difficult trade 
offs and tough choices, such as providing benefits for all at the cost o f reducing the relatively 
high level of benefits historically enjoyed by non-blacks."'’ COSATU has embraced the logic 
of this argument, and has called for an investigation into the ways in which “social insurance 
and the provision of social assistance can best be integrated to achieve the most effective - 
and widest possible - social security net.”"’
The integration of labor market variation and welfare allows a degree of “regulated 
flexibility” in the labor market - greater job and wage dilferentiation - in return for a 
minimum standard o f benefits, thereby ameliorating the impact on workers of variation ““ 
Variation gives incentives to individual capitals - particularly in small, labor-intensive firms - 
to invest and create jobs, while the social wage provides workers at the lower end of the labor 
market and the unemployed with a degree of income security. Moreover, labor will be more 
accommodating of flexibility where workers’ concessions can be offset by a system of public 
benefits. These benefits are extremely important in a labor-surplus economy where job
creation will be slow, while the consequences of adjustment are felt immediately
“Regulated flexibility” also means that the specific terms of the concessions should be 
determined in negotiations through the current industrial relations institutions industry-wide 
bargaining councils, as well as through workplace-level forms of codetermination These 
enable workers and employers to bargain on concessions and to reach agreements that are 
appropriate to a specific context They also enable the parties to negotiate improvements as 
conditions improve, thereby helping to ensure that concessions do not become permanent 
Where workers are not covered by such institutions, the new Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act allows for ministerial determinations of minimum conditions
But the concessions also require an active and strong developmental state to maintain 
a system of social welfare that is integrated with these labor market agreements Public 
benefits are not limited only to the forms of transfer payments described above. Recalling the 
“productivist welfare” arguments made by Rogers and Streeck, they also currently include a 
range of public expenditure on education, training, health, transport and housing essential to a 
modern economy. Concretely, such benefits assist job creation directly by producing a higher 
skilled, more secure workforce, but also help contain employers’ costs (for example on 
medical insurance), thereby creating multiple incentives for job creation As above, these 
transfer payments need to be integrated with the system of labor market compromises
Finally, the concessions require capital to relinquish unilateral control over investment 
and production decisions by embracing forms of codetermination at the micro, meso, and 
macro levels In the absence of such joint decision-making it is likely that the surpluses 
generated through wage stability and labor market variation would benefit capital alone, 
rather than generate growth and employment creation
In return for labor gaining increased control over the distribution of the surplus capital 
gains a more productive workforce and flexibility conducive to job creation These are 
necessary conditions for the stability of profit over the longer term, and provide capital with 
an incentive to participate in the compromise But this incentive is not open-ended 
Business not only gives up a measure of control over profit and investment to workers, but 
also concedes power to the state: for example, it must accept being brought fully into the 
state’s tax regime where taxation of the increased profits generated by flexibility provides a 
portion of the income stream to fund the redistributive and productivist welfare policies
The interlocking concessions and gains of the class compromise are oriented towards 
the stability o f profit over the longer term as opposed to high rates of profit in the short-term 
Thus far in this section we have argued that the compromise is desirable to resolve the 
tensions between political democratization and economic restructuring in a labor surplus 
semi-peripheral economy Moreover, we feel it is the best way to produce benefits for 
workers without jeopardizing their capacity to make advances in the future. Nor is it clear 
how either the current stalemate or an unspecified intensification of conflict with capital and 
the state will yield similar or better rewards. But if a compromise is desirable, is it possible':’ 
To answer this question we turn for guidance to South Africa’s political “miracle” and 
the processes that encouraged the concessions that enabled it to occur First, the parties have 
to enter a situation of stalemate no one party is able to achieve its objectives. Second, the 
stalemate has to lead to a situation where the costs of not compromising begin to outweigh 
the perceived gains to be realized by standing fast Third, the parties must have access to - or 
be in a position to create - institutional arrangements that allow bargained agreements to be 
reached. Fourth, organizations must be able to represent their constituencies effectively and 
be able to mobilize and restrain followers according to the organization’s strategic and
tactical vision Fifth, it is imperative that individuals are willing to risk making strategic 
choices that may break with their organization’s prior commitments Finally, the 
international context must be conducive to the settlement or, at a minimum, does not serve to 
affirm the parties’ unwillingness to compromise
For such a compromise to take place all parties must share a perception of stalemate 
and be willing to accept a sub-optimal solution to the impasse As we identified above, a 
stalemate in economic policy emerged in 1997 and 1998 when each of the parties perceived 
the possibility of achieving their aims without conceding much to their adversaries. The state 
reftjsed to negotiate the terms and elements o f an alternative to GEAR. In the face of the 
policy’s inability to generate growth or employment, their best offer remained more of the 
same, combined with growing intolerance of criticism. For capital, its “triumph” lay in the 
collapse o f socialism and the apparent omnipotence o f globalization and its capacity to 
discipline labor on a variety of fronts. They remained committed to an even purer version of 
GEAR and to a dogmatic adherence to labor market flexibility that would require a reversal 
of many of the institutional and labor market advances noted in Part IT Finally, labor in fact 
pursued many of these compromises in practice, but its rhetoric and official policies blocked 
its capacity to make wage and labor market concessions in a strategic fashion that would yield 
positive outcomes to itself, the unemployed, and to capital and the state. The refusal to 
acknowledge such variation may have profound consequences for the movement; internally it 
may hinder strategic thinking, while publicly it may make the unions’ positions less credible 
to both their supporters and their bargaining partners It is, in other words, conceding the 
flexibility business seeks without gaining much in return
There have been signs in recent months that the parties may have judged that the costs 
of holding to their strong positions are beginning to outweigh the gams to be had by standing 
fast, and that they are willing to make some of the most important concessions necessary for 
such a compromise The long-awaited Jobs Summit finally occurred in October 1998 and an 
unexpectedly high degree o f convergence occurred in the core positions o f government, 
business, labor, and the community sector The summit’s success hinged on the tacit 
acceptance by all parties that while modest variations were necessary, both GEAR and the 
main pillars o f the post-apartheid industrial relations and labor market legislation would be 
preserved.
Notwithstanding differences about specific reforms - some o f which may yet provoke 
considerable conflict - the parties implicitly accepted that increased investment and economic 
growth on their own would not generate employment growth unless yoked to a 
comprehensive job creation program There was considerable agreement about the main 
elements:
• Industrial policy measures and programs to directly address unemployment and 
increased investment,
• Enhancing the delivery of housing and to increase the amount of rental stock 
available,
• Human resource development in the form of training, education and targeted 
programs for youth, women and the disabled,
• Public works programs;
• Regulatory reforms to facilitate higher levels of saving and investment in the 
economy;
• A social plan to avoid job losses and employment decline and, where job losses are 
unavoidable, to manage retrenchments and ameliorate their eft'ects on individuals and
0local economies;
• A comprehensive social security system, aimed especially at those living in poverty 
and the unemployed ”
These proposals come close to matching the terms of the class compromise described 
above. They presuppose both an activist state and a strong emphasis on reaching agreements 
through bargaining in established institutions Most importantly, the summit established new 
explicit rules forjudging the “credibility” of macroeconomic policy Not only must it meet 
technical criteria, such as sustainability and stability, but it must enjoy “broad support in 
society” :
No group in our society can be allowed to perceive, or in fact experience, that they 
carry the full burden o f the costs and enjoy none of the benefits o f this reform”
The commitment acknowledges the tensions between economic liberalization and democratic 
consolidation inherent in South Africa’s double transition Any solutions to South Africa’s 
economic crisis now must also pass a legitimation test, and an exacting one at that: they must 
be arrived at through a democratic process and they must be broadly acceptable, and this will 
be more likely if they address the inequalities generated by globalization and neoliberal 
policies
It is unclear whether the summit’s results represent mere rhetoric or a growing 
convergence o f interests Time will tell whether the commitments were made in good faith 
It is significant that all parties emphasized that the summit was not a conclusion, but rather 
the beginning of an open-ended process, which may yet go awry The answer depends in 
large part on the second condition identified above: whether the parties believe that the costs 
o f stalemate outweigh the gains to be had by standing firm
The evidence from the last year is mixed The ANC and its allies in the unions, the 
SACP and community organizations clearly have a motivation to seek compromise The poor 
economic performance and the conflict over GEAR threatened to weaken the triple alliance in 
the run-up to the 1999 elections, and contributed to declining approval ratings for the ANC in 
1998 However,
the concessions may not outlive the ANC's landslide victory in the June 2 1999 contest. It not 
only shored up its previously declining support, but substantially increased its parliamentary 
advantage, falling just shy of a two-thirds majority The party may interpret the results as a 
vindication of GEAR rather than as a mandate for the Jobs Summit concessions, and may be 
emboldened to go it alone again.
As important as the political calculations, the past year saw a steep fall in the value of 
the rand, and dramatic hikes in interest rates that severely limited growth In the wake of the 
Asian economic collapse these conditions generated fears that South Africa was at best facing 
recession, and at worst, on the verge of a major economic crisis These straightened 
economic circumstances contributed to a four-fold increase in strike activity, the highest since 
the ANC took office in 1994, though still below the levels recorded during the struggle 
against apartheid More important, many of the strikes were of long duration, and revolved 
almost entirely around wages, yet little was achieved: there is no evidence that strike 
settlements overall were more advantageous than those achieved through negotiations alone 
Workers’ demands for double-digit increa.ses were met by management resolve to limit 
increases to the 7.6% inflation rate. If the increased activity has not yielded benefits for most 
strikers, it certainly did not encourage employers to invest or to employ more workers, 
especially in an increasingly open economy. Such conflict may generate a vicious circle of 
economic decline prompting increased conflict over demands that cannot be fulfilled, which
in turn speeds the decline It is possible that such fears aided the agreements at the Jobs 
Summit, but it is unlikely that conflict has been sufficient to discipline all parties into shifting 
- as in Kerala - from “class struggle” to “class compromise.”
In summary, the first condition identified above has been met: South Africa has 
reached a stalemate where government’s and business’ insistence on staying the course has 
been met with increasing levels o f resistance. The third condition - the development of 
institutions through which bargained agreements can be reached - has also been met and is 
one of the most important legacies o f South Africa’s transition to democracy, as described in 
Part II above. Notwithstanding other problems associated with the recent strikes, it is 
important to stress that almost all followed the procedures of the LRA Furthermore, unions 
have used the LRA’s provision allowing industrial action in pursuit o f socio-economic goals, 
most notably in separate actions to halt retrenchments in gold mining and the public 
education system, and to block privatization of municipal services Most significantly, in 
these cases industrial action was averted after processes were established to address each of 
the problems/*
Surprisingly, the sixth condition is also beginning to be realized A growing number 
of influential neoliberal economists and policymakers are questioning the efficacy of their 
economic and social policies. Most notably, in a critique o f neoliberalism. World Bank chief 
economist and senior vice-president Joseph Stiglitz has called for an end to “misguided” 
policies imposed from Washington and has endorsed what he described as egalitarian and 
democratic development As Galbraith remarked recently, when asked whether he thought 
there would be a Keynesian response in the United States,
Inevitable It’s not because people are starting to read the General Theory again, it’s 
because there is no ready alternative Low interest rates and government support o f 
employment - there isn’t anything else
The return to certain Keynesian solutions is increasingly being advocated at both the national 
and international levels to develop some regulation over the perverse forms of financial 
instability generated by globalization. The deepening crisis in East Asia could well fuel these 
developments, making a compromise in South Africa a more sustainable proposition
But the other critical conditions do not yet exist It is not fully clear whether the 
parties have been disciplined by the threat of disorder such that they perceive a sub-optimal 
solution as preferable to class stalemate Furthermore, it is not yet clear whether any of the 
parties can summon their constituencies to support a compromise or that there are leaders 
willing to make bold departures and tough strategic choices, such as those that made the 
political settlement possible.
Labor, it is said, has demonstrated great ability to use collective action to open doors, 
but has difficulty walking through them Even where it has the will, it may lack the capacity 
to make effective use of the institutions it helped create Curiously, it may not be the 
weakest link. Business associations are not encompassing, and cannot effectively discipline 
their members. The state - though possessing an advanced bureaucracy in comparison with 
other developing countries - is undergoing dramatic lestructuring to overcome the 
authoritarian, racist and commandist legacies of the apartheid era.
The greatest problems exist in the coinnuinity sector, where there are a plurality of 
strongly competing interests, where organizations are relatively undeveloped, and where few 
of those that exist are able to represent their members elfectively Not only have the most 
powerful community organizations - the civic associations that emerged during the struggle 
against apartheid - declined greatly in power, but under South Africa’s new pluralist
0democracy rivals are now able to compete for membership Civic assocations have 
experienced problems shifting from their oppositional role, not only because they lack 
internal capacity, but because they have had difficulty differentiating themselves from 
political parties on the one hand and development agencies on the other The most serious 
problem exists among marginalized groups those working in the informal sector, the 
unemployed, rural women, urban and rural youth Here formal independent organization is at 
best nascent, at worst absent, and there is a possibility that such strata will be drawn into 
vertical patron-client networks as a survival strategy ""
These difficulties are formidable, but are not insurmountable Both labor and 
community organizations have in the past shown remarkable resilience and creativity in the 
face o f daunting obstacles Moreover, it is important not to overemphasize the crisis among 
community organizations; depending on definitions they number about 5,000, and many of 
these are today more focused and streamlined than in the 1980s, with increased monitoring 
capacity.'® But it remains an open question whether they will be able to play an effective 
representational role and be able to seize the opportunities described above The labor 
movement’s strategic renewal and the reinvention of community associational life remain 
among the most important challenges in South Africa’s democratization
CONCLUSION
We have identified the reemergence of the possibility o f class compromise, but on 
terms different from those of the historic compromises struck in both the north and the south 
after the second world war This compromise is an attempt to resolve the tensions between 
economic reconstruction and the consolidation of democracy in developing countries such 
that the costs o f reform are more equitably distributed between and within the social classes
We have taken South Africa as our case study and have shown how during the 
struggle for democracy institutions emerged that allowed for agreements to be reached 
between collective actors. These allow for bargaining over the terms of South Africa’s re­
entry into the world economy, what we have called bargained liberalization As a 
consequence, these institutions provide the possibility for reconciling conflicting class 
interests through a class compromi.se. We have furthermore identified the terms of a 
compromise that could yield growth, equity and redistribution in a labor surplus semi­
peripheral context, drawing on the experience of Kerala We argued that the establishment of 
a fourth constituency - community-based interest groups - in NEDLAC is an attempt to avoid 
the dangers o f a narrow corporatism by providing the marginalized with an institutional voice 
in economic and social policy-making But these groups’ capacity and representational 
ability remain in doubt, and no firm alliance has yet emerged between them and labor While 
debates are taking place on how these vulnerable groups of workers could be organized, the 
creation of strong community-based organizations and their link with the labor movement is a 
necessary, but unrealized condition for a class compromise
Drawing on the experience of the successful political compromise that enabled South 
Africa’s political miracle, we argue that a number of conditions necessary for such a 
compromise have emerged. This is not to say that a class compromise will ensue, though in 
recent months important commitments have been made in this direction South Africa’s 
political compromise was a rare achievement, and whether it can be repeated - in arguably the 
more difficult terrain of the economy - remains to be seen The alternatives - continued 
stalemate, increased disorder, and a “descent into decentralized collective violence” - are also 
possible. But paradoxically, these also provide the strongest incentives for South Africa to
achieve what many people believe - as they did in the 1980s - an impossible task.
Finally, the South African experience suggests the need for further research into the 
prospects for bargained liberalization in other countries attempting to consolidate democracy 
under conditions o f economic reconstruction Clearly the range and depth o f bargaining that 
has developed in South Africa will not be easily replicable On the other hand, aspects of 
bargained liberalization - and with them the prospects for developing a new balance between 
market and society - may be possible in a wider range of cases than is currently understood 
Rather than designing new ways to insulate decision makers from the claims of citizens and 
popular organizations - the elusive search for the democratic functional equivalents of 
authoritarian rule - it might be more advantageous to identify ways in which democratic 
solutions can be found to the problems of the double transition.
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